Toward Regional Urban Planning Support in Post-Conflict West Africa

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ABSTRACT

Urban planning strategies and initiatives that focus on one city or simply "the city," inconsiderate of the regional networks, will fail to developed policies that encourage inclusive growth. Thus, creating further economic dependency on the capital and perpetuating historic grievances caused by policies that treat vast regions as homogenous. Two basic questions frame this context: A) How can development strategy introduce a rational planning scheme into a post-conflict context? That strengthens the role of good governance rather than rewarding bad governmental habits. And, B) Under which circumstances could development be done better through the strategic use planning and urban planners? The role of urban planning should be targeted and enhanced in post-crisis redevelopment, and in cities or regions where crisis may be looming urban planning should be strengthened. Three reasons in support of this statement are: A) Urban planners often act as the liaison between multiple government agencies; B) They are trained civil servants without political agendas (often un-elected); and, C) From a local perspective, they understand the context of their cities and regions better than any international aid worker or foreign diplomat. The role of urban planning must strengthen good governance in order to help reduce conflict and perhaps prevent other conflicts from occurring altogether especially where conflict and its causal factors are not restricted by sovereign territorial borders.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the support and feedback of my Advisor, Professor Elliott Sclar, my Reader, Professor John Hirsch, and my classmates, friends, and family. Thank you all.

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Cover Image: Village near the UNESCO World Heritage Site at Bandiagara, in Dogon country, Mali

Cover Image Source: Lauren Canton

INTRODUCTION

Since independence, over a half century ago, many of West Africa's sixteen countries have been home to some form of violent conflict, in addition to the region's 300+ million residents[1]. The issues pertaining to instability facing West Africa and the Sahel continue to draw attention to the need for better governance in the region and the role *good* governance will have for fostering sustainable strategies for development. In a region of the world dominated by agriculture and extractive industries (i.e. mining and logging) – otherwise not known for its progressive urban environments – cities are emerging and those that already exist are expanding. Also expanding are the spheres of influence that constrained, negligent, or misguided governments, often funded by western actors, have over their urban residents as more and more people seek urban opportunities that are nonexistent in the rural regions. Policies that encourage inclusive growth and sustainable development, both statewide and regionally, will continue to fall short if the attention continues to be on one singular city and disregards larger regional networks – thus becoming another link in a historically long chain of grievances for communities further removed from their country's economic and political centers. The necessity to wrestle with and understand these dynamic forces that affect governance and development, both local and international, is becoming increasingly urgent.

The purpose of this thesis is to better understand the role that urban planning can play in addressing the development challenges of West African countries with special attention to conflict and post-conflict environments. In doing so I will explore the fundamental challenges that urban planning practice faces as local experiences are adapted to statewide and regional perspectives. The basic question being, how can development strategy introduce a rational planning scheme into a post-conflict context?

What role can urban planning play in addressing the development challenges of the region particularly in regards to conflict and post-conflict environments? Understanding the push and pull factors of migration and conflict in regions like West Africa is important for understanding

[1] World Bank. Collective (2013) population figures for: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte D'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guniea, Guniea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sénégal, Sierra Leone, and Togo

general urbanization and community planning trends holistically as well as the urban-rural divide that often exists in developing countries. Within the challenges of *governance* the push/pull factors may include (but they are not limited to):

- *Physical* challenges such as, city boundaries, urban to peri-urban to rural transitions, and urban slums;
- *Security* challenges such as, transnational migration, conflict, and humanitarian crisis;
- *Environmental* challenges such as, climate change, and resource management and provision; and
- *Administrative* challenges such as, weak institutional capacity, underserved civil-societies, and community participation.

These are just a few of the many challenges that often manifest themselves in the urban context. Policy changes and implementation that lack a greater regional focus render isolated urban environments, spatially removed from the capital, exposed and vulnerable to issues related to poverty that when unaddressed lead to instability and to potentially violent conflict.

URBAN PLANNING (THEORY)

As issues pertaining to urbanization become increasingly ubiquitous across Africa, urban planning will play an important role in development practice in regards to project design and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation. Whether it is done *well* will be determined by those actors within the field of development who occupy key decision making capacities. Therefore, it is important to understand specifically what *urban planning* means and how it is interpreted by this thesis for development purposes in West Africa. As a starting place a strong definition of the term comes from two prominent figures in urban planning theory, Scott Campbell and Susan S. Fainstein in their book *Readings in Planning Theory* (2011):

> [Urban] Planning must define (and defend) itself by differentiating itself from its larger neighbors: if next to architecture, planning will emphasize the socio-economic city; in relation to geography, planning stresses the field's policy orientation; if adjacent to public policy, planners focus on space and local

> communities and in contrast to most economists, planners attend to issues of social justice. These institutional boundary lines become crucial when planning shifts its academic location, such as from a school of design to a school of public policy, business, or social welfare.

As this thesis is equally concerned with theory as much as it is with the practical application of urban planning to conflict and post-conflict development let us also begin by interpreting this definition and placing it within the context of West Africa. An important element of the definition stated above, is that urban planning plays many different roles. Depending on the context in which urban planners find themselves one or more of the above applications may rise above the others. Often times, especially in the developing country context, it is not always as easily differentiated in practice. Often is the experience that many of urban planning's "neighbors" are active simultaneously, especially in the fluctuating political environment of Africa, and in particular the rapid urbanization of West African cities. Thus, it is important to not limit oneself to a single viewpoint by this definition but to remember that there are many perspectives within the urban planning field, all of which are important when designing holistic policies and strategies.

Urban planners are often caught in a seemingly endless game of tug-o-war with various different municipal, regional, and governmental agencies, civil society actors, and community activist. It is this role, which I have come refer to as the *liaison-extraordinaire*, that should be developed critically, especially in conflict and post-conflict settings to strength resilience and mitigate conflict relapse. Furthermore, it is the position of this thesis that good urban planning, (that is urban planning done thoughtfully, thoroughly, and holistically) should never need to "defend" itself.

Most relevant for the focus of this thesis, from a regional perspective in Africa and West Africa, is the definition's emphasis on space and local communities, social justice, and development

policies (urban, peri-urban, and regional). So let us then move forward that urban planning in the context of development, especially as it applies to West Africa will:

1) Build on the socio-economic strengths of city while empowering its socio-economically marginalize communities;
2) Highlight and mitigate spatial disparities; and
3) Address insufficient and isolating policies.

Many West African countries have experienced recent conflict or crisis. Mali has been chosen as a case study for this thesis due to its regional centrality, its geographic mass and diversity, and its socio-economic composition and subsequent challenges. Mali is also in the midst of a political transition as well as both domestic and regional conflicts. Before the military coup of 2012 Mali was considered to be a pillar of democratic values and stability in West Africa. As a point of reference Scott A. Bollens, in his article "Urbanism, Political Uncertainty and Democratization" (Urban Studies, 2008) discusses the urban dynamics of political transitions:

> National and international agreements that create democracy, while absolutely essential, frequently impose a set of abstract and often remote rules and institutions on the urban landscape. In contrast, urban strategies are capable of addressing the complex spatial, social-psychological and organizational challenges of living together or alongside each other under a new political dispensation.

The "national and international agreements" which Bollens alludes to must also consider the context of conflict and the divergent interest of the actors involved. By analyzing the case of Mali this thesis will attempt to present empirical evidence that will shed light on the debate and extract urban planning applications that are appropriate to West Africa and to the development context of Africa and post-crisis countries; and at the same time shift our linear perspectives as we spatially approach urban planning and temporally respond to and conflict or post-conflict situations that are cyclical.

BACKGROUND

Urbanization and Growth Trends

Africa is rapidly urbanizing more than any other region in the world. According to the African Development Bank Group (ADBG) in 2012, Africa exceed all other developing countries and regions in terms of urban growth at 3.5% over the past twenty years; a rate that is expected to continue through the next three decades. If this remains true the urban population of Africa will nearly double (181%) over the next 30 years.

Across the whole of Africa, the majority of Africans do not live in urban areas – yet. However, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) has estimated that, adhering to the 2010 urbanization trends, by the year 2050, 61.6% of all Africans will live in cities. Furthermore, 68.4% of all West Africans will live in cities; and in Mali this figure is expected be 65.3%, (UN-HABITAT 2010, 99-100). For West Africa in particular it is estimated that the majority of its citizens will live in urban areas closer to the year 2020 rather than 2050. This incredible rate of urbanization poses unique developmental challenges to a region characterized by extreme poverty. Referred to simply as *over-urbanization*, it occurs when populations grow faster than their respective economies; and this thesis would add – faster than their respective governments' capacities, (UN-HABITAT 2005, 6).

The growth rate referenced above (3.5%), as indicated by ADBG, is the *urban* growth rate, and should not be mistaken for total population growth. However, overall population growth is also on the rise even more so in Africa than other parts of the world and it is worth comparing briefly in order to provide a sense of scale. For the past 10 years, according to World Bank statistics, the world's population growth rate has averaged 1.2%. As a comparison, of the three most populated countries in the world, China has averaged 0.5%, largely in part due to the *one-child-policy*; India leads the charge with an average of 1.4%, and the United States of America (USA) falls between the two at an average of 0.9%. In terms of geographical significance, the total land area of these three countries (21,508,000 square kilometers) can fit comfortably within the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region (24,291,100 sq.km.) with approximately 2.2 million

square kilometers to spare (not including any of Africa's island nations). Of these three countries, in terms of size, West Africa (6,146,140 sq.km.) is comparable to the contiguous USA if the five western states were lopped off (6,034,411 sq.km.)[2]. The population growth rate for SSA for the same time period has averaged 2.7%. In West Africa specifically the average has been 2.4%.

According to UN-HABITAT figures, Africa's total population crossed the one-billion person threshold in 2009 with an estimated 395 million living in urban areas (nearly 40%). The continent will achieve the two-billion milestone at approximately 2050, at which point, as indicated by the estimates previously mentioned, over 1.2 billion (60%) will live in urban environments, (UN-HABITAT 2010, 1). Additionally, unless considerable measures are taken quickly a sizeable portion of those urban dwellers will live in slums or informal settlements. "This rapid expansion has changed the continent's demographic landscape. Yet, urbanization in Africa has failed to bring about inclusive growth which, in turn, has resulted in proliferation of slums, urban poverty and rising inequality," (ADBG 2012).

The percentage of urban dwellers varies across different regions of the continent. Credit is given to North African governments for better development practices when compared to SSA. In 2012, the SSA had a lower percentage of urban residents, 32.8%, but a much higher percentage of slum dwellers, 65%. Much of this disparity is attributed to inadequate infrastructure and service provision especially to poor communities. However, the ADBG also points out the role of institutions in Africa's current state of affairs. "Weak institutions have contributed to poor urban enforcement, resulting in dysfunctional land and housing markets, which in turn has caused mushrooming of informal settlements," (ADBG 2012).

As cities in Africa expand, if governments continue to mismanage and misallocate land, rather than develop more inclusive or "pro-poor" policies appropriately, and succumb to their limited governance capacities, then informal settlements will continue to multiply. These informal

[2] World Bank Figures for the USA minus Alaska, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington

settlements undermine the formal systems' functionality and legitimacy and could ultimately be an important contributor to instability. "When public policies are of benefit only for small political or economic elites, urbanization will almost inevitably result in in instability, as cities become unlivable for rich and poor alike," (UN-HABITAT 2010, 1). As informal urban dwellers are not included in the social and economic prosperity of the formal city, these informal forms of governance (not initially negative) create pathways for black market activities, gangs, and crime to become prevalent, fueled by the rural to urban migration of low-skilled and uneducated migrant workers. These rapidly expanding urban communities put increased pressure on the region's natural resources; as cities grow they consume more resources and require more space often at the expense of the urban poor not to mention the demands on the local ecosystem.

CASE STUDY: MALI

Statistical Data

For Mali, its landlocked position straddling the Sahel and its vastly diverse north-south ecosystems are an added challenge. In his book, *When Things Fell Apart* (2008), Robert Bates summarizes the ramifications of this challenge as follows:

> In West Africa, the richer regions lie in the southern portions, which are heavily forested. The Sahelian regions – dry and with uncertain rainfall – have little to offer the international economy; lying inland from the coast, what little they have to offer has necessarily to be shipped at high cost, leaving few profits for producers. Throughout West Africa, then, there exist a disparity between the economies of the coast and interior, (Bates 2008, 64).



Mali is highlighted as it is an important country in the West African region for the following reasons:

1) Its central position within the region of West Africa spanning diverse ecological systems;
2) It is territorially one of the largest countries of the region;
3) Its population growth rate for the past 10 years has averaged 3.0%, placing it third for the region behind the Gambia (3.2%) and Niger (3.9%); and
4) Historically it has been a beacon of democracy and stability on the continent until recent events beginning in 2012.

Using the most recent available data from the World Bank from 2003 through 2013 Table 1 in illustrates where Mali ranks in terms of overall population growth, territory, and density as compared to the continent as well as the 16 countries that comprise the West African region. Mali's central position within the region poses unique development and governance challenges spanning the Sahel from the Sahara Desert in the north to the much more tropical jungles of the south. In terms of total land area, Mali is slightly less than twice the size of Texas, at just

over 1.2 million square kilometers (second only to Niger at approximately 1.3 million sq.km.). Geographically, the country is easily divided into the north (3 sub-regions: Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal) and the south (5 sub-regions: Kayes, Skasso, Ségou, Koulikoro, and Mopti; and the capital district, Bamako).



The Niger River

The Niger River is the region's largest source of fresh water. It is the third largest river basin in Africa and it supports the livelihoods of over 130 million people across nine countries – seven of which according to a recent World Bank article are among the world's 20 poorest countries, (World Bank, 2014). Its source in the eastern Fouta Djallon highlands of Guinea is only 240 km. (150 mi.) inland from the Atlantic Ocean through Sierra Leone. Yet instead the river flows northeast in a clockwise arch for 4,200 km. (2,600 mi.) through the southern Sahara Desert of Mali, in Timbuktu at its keystone, eventually emptying into the Gulf of Guinea near Onitsha, Nigeria. Along its way it passes through Guinea, Mali, Niger, Benin, and Nigeria. The challenges and demands placed on the Niger River are quite substantial. "The population in the basin is

highly vulnerable, with seventy percent of the basin's 130 million inhabitants living in rural areas amidst food insecurity due to due to extreme climate and rainfall variability," (World Bank, 2014). The seasonal fluctuations of the water levels at various parts of the Niger River make year-round navigation impossible. Within Mali specifically, the northern portion of the river surrounding the city of Gao is navigable for large flat-bottom barges from September to December and similarly in portions around the city of Timbuktu. However, approximately 325 km. of the Niger River at its northern most segment between the two cities allows for year-round river traffic (Andersen et al., 2005.). Commerce along the Niger River is dependent on seasonal fluctuations of the water level, in the dry season.

According to data provided in the 1997 report entitled, "Irrigation Potential for Africa" produced by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, the portion of the Niger River Basin territory that is in Mali accounts for just over 25%. Mali's territory in the north is extremely arid, dominated by the Sahara Desert whereas the south is much more tropical. The World Bank statistics estimate that agricultural land in Mali accounts for 34.1% of the total land area. However, of the 1.2 million sq. km. a mere 78,000 sq.km. (5.6%) is arable land. According to 2006 data agricultural in Mali accounted for 34.1% of the total land area, and the agricultural sector accounted for 66% of total employment. It is unclear, according to World Bank information as to what percent of agricultural land in Mali is irrigated; however according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook that figure is 2,358 sq. km. This is especially important considering the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) most recent development plan for Mali was issued in November 2014. The "Mali Results Framework Paper" indicates that Mali has 'significant potential' for irrigated agriculture, livestock production, and fisheries; however, the development objectives related to livelihood diversification seem to only address agricultural production which will only be beneficial to the south.



Transportation Infrastructure

Mobility is another important issue in post-conflict redevelopment as the provision of emergency aid is directly impacted by the quality and quantity of the roads and airport runways. The CIA World Factbook estimates that of Mali's 22,474 km. (nearly 14,000 miles) of roadways only 5,522 (3,400 mi.) are paved – meaning the majority of Mali's roads 16,952 km. (10,500 mi.) are dirt and are, thus, easily damaged or washed away during the rainy season. However, it is not clear exactly how many kilometers of roadways in the north are paved or dirt. This is an important fact considering the north experiences dramatically less rain fall than the south. Finally concerning transportation and mobility, of Mali's 25 airports only eight have paved runways. In times of conflict when emergency aid supplies are a matter of life or death accessibility becomes extremely important. In periods of redevelopment, and further development, accessibility directly affects the livelihoods of people dependent on selling goods in the market, tourism, and other forms of economic trade.



Population

Continuing with the comparison to Texas, with nearly double the amount of land it is surprising that Texas is nearly twice the population of Mali. Of Africa's 54 countries, Mali ranks 21st in terms of total population. However, at over 15.3 million people it is the 6th largest in the West African region. According to latest official census data collected in 2009 by Mali's Institut National de la Statistique (National Institute of Statistics) over 90% of the population live in the southern half of Mali that is just slightly less than 430,000 sq.km. or 34% of the country's total footprint.

A substantial 47.4 (5th worldwide) percent of Malians under the age of 15 in 2013 with 49.8% (190th worldwide) are between 15 and 64. Together these figures indicate that Mali has a very young population. World Bank data does not disaggregate total population ranges beyond 0-14, 15-64, 64+. However, according to the CIA World Factbook, it is estimated that 19% of Malians are between the age of 15 and 24. This means that 66.4% of the Malian population is under the age of 25. Compared to the four countries that ranked above Mali (Niger, Chad,

Uganda, and Angola) concerning the percent of the population below age 15, when the percent of the population between 15 and 24 years is also accounted for Mali then ranks third worldwide behind Uganda (69.9%) and Niger (68.2%). Compared to world statistics this age group (age 0 to 24) represents nearly 42.4% of the global population; and within the three most populated countries it is 46.6% in India, 33.1% in the United States, and 31.8% in China. This is particularly significant when considering the high rate of unemployment that also exist across Africa. The African Economic Outlook (AEO) organization estimated in 2012 that unemployment in Mali was 15.4% for job seekers between the age of 15 and 39. The AEO further estimated that, this age range was 81.5% of all unemployed Malians, (AEO 2012, 2). "Youth unemployment is a critical problem in Mali. Almost 300,000 young people join the job market every year. According to official estimates, unemployment affects 9.6% of the overall population. However, this rate masks disparities by age, gender and place of residence, (AEO 2012, 14)."

The coup d'état that occurred in 2012 is of particular importance due to the fact that a peaceful resolution is still to be fully realized[3], and its relevance to the development disparities between the northern cities/regions and the country's capital, Bamako. West Africa is no stranger to crisis, in addition to the recent events pertaining to Ebola many of the regions countries have prolifically experienced concerns pertaining to food security, coups d'états, extreme religious fundamentalism, and human rights violations. In Mali, a battle over the "ungovernable" northern regions of the country, has been waged and continues over territorial control, sparked by the military coup d'état in 2012. "Mali represents an acute combination of the challenges of poor governance, constitutional crisis, armed rebellion, and growing criminality," (Affa'a-Mindzie 2013). The three northernmost regions in Mali, Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao, are adamantly concerned about issues of regional security, governance, and development that have been lacking in recent years. The diversity of ethnic groups, nomadic and sedentary lifestyles, geographical distance from Bamako, and influence of non-state fundamentalist/jihadist organizations are key factors in the complexity of the situation. Many

[3] A peace agreement could be very close as the 5th round of talks in February 2015 led to the cease fire of Taureg rebels, reported by Reuters.

northern residents have indicated factors of urbanization and development as key grievances in the region. The recent conflict in Mali, although highly political, is as Affa'a-Mindzie says in part representative of the issue of poor governance. However, it is more specifically the lack of governance that has allowed for the proliferation of illicit trade networks.



In 2014 and 2015, in Sub-Saharan West Africa, issues concerning resource management and urban growth have been further complicated by the recent Ebola outbreak drawing attention to the regions poor public health infrastructure and emergency response capabilities. While there is speculation that at least *some* progress is being achieved on the Ebola front, in March 2015, the World Health Organization placed the estimated figure of active cases at over 25,000 of which over 14,000 are confirmed. The number of deaths is estimated to be over 10,000 across the region's most affected areas. The largest concentrations of which have been in the urban and peri-urban areas around the capital cities of Monrovia in Liberia and Freetown in Sierra Leone (New York Times 2014).

Government Structure

The Republic of Mali's governmental structure is a tripartite system, similar to that of the United States at the higher levels. There are executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The executive branch is headed by the president, currently His Excellency Monsieur Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta elected in 2013 for a five year term. The president then appoints a prime minister and 27 additional ministers that comprise the Council of Ministers. The legislative branch consists of one legislative arm or Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly) comprising of 160 members elected to five-year teams. Members of judicial branch are appointed by the Ministry of Justice.

Mali is further divided into eight administrative regions, in the north, Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu; and in the south, Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti, Ségou, and Siakasso; and the district of Bamako. The eight administrative regions fall under the authority of an appointed governor or prefect. Those regions are further broken down into Cercles (Circles), then into communes, followed by quartiers (villages or neighborhoods). Cercles are overseen by commandants and the other levels municipal governments headed by a mayor. According to Mali's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The decentralization process has started with the establishment of 702 elected municipal councils, headed by elected mayors, (Embassy of the Republic of Mali, 2015)."

Conflict Context

Most current figures provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) regarding the conflict in Northern Mali indicate that there are over 428,000 Malians labeled as part of the "population of concern." Of that figure 147,685 are refugees, an additional 128,866 are internally displaced persons (IDP), and 125,956 are returned IDPs whom UNHCR is in the process of repatriating. Since the eruption of violence following the coup d'état in 2012 the World Bank has estimated that there have been over 1,000 battle-related deaths[4]. Battle-related deaths include all causalities (civilian and military) incurred as a result of specific conflict (World Bank 2015).

[4] 2012 – 2013 figures only, four-fifths of the deaths occurring in 2013. 2014 data is not yet available.

Recalling again our definition of urban planning stated earlier, of the many different roles that urban planners may play, few contexts are as multifaceted as a protracted conflict or post-conflict environment. Such is the case in Mali where individual, bilateral, and multilateral actors come and go frequently throughout the duration of the conflict, the negotiation period, and the peace-keeping and peace-building or redevelopment processes. With each transition in leadership new agendas superseded the previous administration's policies. In managing the dynamics of individual leaders and their policies this is an example of a time when urban planners should focus on the spatial and local communities in and around Bamako. The list of different actors at various levels and stages throughout the conflict in Mali is extensive. Beginning with identifiable key individuals perhaps most impactful in the beginning was Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo. Captain Sanogo was the chief of the military junta responsible for the initial coup d'état in March 2012. Most recently he was arrested on charges related to the disappearance of soldiers who at the time remained loyal to the ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré, (Diarra 2013). President Touré was scheduled to complete his second and final term of office in June 2012, a mere matter of months. Following the coup in late March the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) implemented economic sanctions on Mali forcing Captain Sanogo to relinquish his control over the government to an appointed interim president. An agreement was reached and would restore Mali to a constitutional government on April 6, 2012 under the leadership of the president of the national assembly Dioncounda Traoré. Traoré temporary term in office was characterized by deep tension after immediately declaring to "wage a total and relentless war," (Telegraph 2012) against Tuareg rebels and the proclaimed independent state of Azawad. This incited additional violence that ultimately hospitalized Traoré following a failed attempt at his life. He completed his role as Mali's interim president when elections were held in August 2013, where Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta won by a considerable majority, "with 77% of the vote in elections with an historically high voter turnout," (USAID 2014, 5). As each subsequent leader has left his mark on Mali over the past few years, this high voter turnout indicates an inclination of the population to

participate in governance processes more than what has been previously experienced. This ownership is something urban planners must facilitate further.

As the perspective on the conflict in Mali moves outward from Bamako and into the northern regions the many different groups of actors play more influential roles. Each of course have their own leadership leveraging their constituents' demands however they are acting in a much more coordinated capacity against the Malian government based primarily on geographic distinctions. In such a context the urban planning would focus on "policy orientation" as our definition states. This means that policies originating from the capital must be positioned in a way that accounts for geographic differences. These additional key rebel groups and belligerents include: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA); Ansar al-Dïn, the Islamist group led by former Tuareg rebel Iyad al-Ghali assisting the MNLA; Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a network of armed extremist groups operating in the region; and the Taureg, a nomadic clans with historical ties to the northern regions of Mali. Historically the Taureg opposed to French colonial occupation and has had subsequent conflicts/revolts against the Malian government following independence from France in 1960; currently at the heart of the conflict. Such policy distinctions for which urban planning should play a role means tailoring policies to the needs and requirements of specific regions that allow for cultural differences, but at the same time incorporate disenfranchised communities into the national identity that is diverse in nature.

Regional, bilateral, and multilateral actors include: Burkina Faso, France, and Algeria; ECOWAS, European Union, African Union, and the United Nations via the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). These actors although geographically important enter only after the conflict is established and are most influential during the negotiation and redevelopment process. At such a point in time, to recall our definition once more "architecture" or infrastructure design and development becomes the context that our urban planner is operating within, at which point as our definition states, "planning will emphasize the social economic city." This is certainly true if we are only

considering the capital city. However, in the context of Mali, the capital city and its detachment from the northern regions was a primary driver of the recent grievances and violent events. Post-conflict planning must emphasize the social economic state.

Understanding the conflict and the various dynamics of which it is comprised in Mali and West Africa is an important characteristic that if not given appropriate consideration will undermine peace-building efforts, good governance policies, and sustainable development. Especially important are the historical drivers of tension in Mali. These conflict components manifest themselves within the religious differences of society however it is the position of this thesis that it would be inappropriate to label the conflict as a battle of religious ideologies and values between Islamic sects without considering other factors at play that I feel are important including poor governance and the lack of governmental capacity, ancient cultural traditions, and economic forces. In this regard it is not simply a battle of Islamic values but rather a battle for survival, existence and self-determination.

> In talking with American and foreign government officials and military officers, [ICG] asked them: If you were a terrorist leader today, where would you locate your base? Some of the same places come up again and again on their list: West Africa, including Nigeria and Mali, (International Crisis Group 2005, 16).

In 2005 the International Crisis Group's (ICG) assessment of terrorism in the Sahel noted that for the region, Mali was at the greatest risk, after Nigeria, of developing "violent Islamist activity." This is in despite of the fact that, less than one decade prior, it was considered to be the golden-child of democracy for West Africa, (ICG 2005, I). The ICG attributed this assessment, not to a particular form of radical Islam, but rather to the welcoming and tolerant nature of Sufi Islam practiced internally, throughout Mali, West Africa, and the Sahel. It is this form of Islam that provides ample opportunity for the more extreme external Islamic forces to find a hospitable environment in which to influence young minds. This coupled with the expansive illicit trade networks that are quite prevalent in Mali's northern frontier has led to

the destabilization of the country. Largely due to the vast geographic and spatial differences between the northern regions and their relationship to the capital Bamako, informal forms of economic trade have created dependency on non-state actors and left the region vulnerable to Islamist extremist.

"Ultimately, the slow response to the crisis throughout 2012 enabled Islamist fighters in the north to consolidate their control, boost recruitment, and prepare for a drawn-out insurgency," (Affa'a-Mindzie 2013, 1). The "slow response" to which Affa'a-Mindzie is referring to is primarily the response of the international community to assist the Malian government. However, there is more to the story, including most significantly, the obvious lack of governmental and military presence in the north on behalf of the Malian government that paved the way for the unrest that consequentially occurred. As part of the peace agreement that came about between Taureg rebels and the Malian government in the 1990's the military presence was removed from the region particularly along the Algerian border – one of three primary smuggling routes to Europe (ICG 2005, 19).

There has been a history of unrest between the Taureg communities in the north and the government in Bamako. Taureg nomads have lived in the region of the Sahel for centuries. Culturally, they are quite different from the population of Malians to the south. Even though they are ethnically distinct from Arabs in North Africa there is much more noticeable difference to the southern population which is predominantly black African. The livelihood of the Taureg communities was and still is predominantly based in livestock, thereby accommodating their nomadic lifestyle. This is a stark contrast to the agriculture-based lifestyle in the south which lends itself towards sedentary livelihoods. This is an important distinction that the aid for development has largely overlooked. Creating aid programs and policies that catered to the agriculture in the south left the north quite isolated from the development world.

Northern Mali is comprised of three primary regions that provide the context for the conflict in the country, they are: Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu (each with primary cities of the same name).

The contribution of religion to the conflict is important to understand these regions and its influence on governance and destabilization. A major factor of the religious dynamics in the north is the role of a particular sect known as the Tablighi. The manner in which the Tablighi or "the way" was able to sow considerable roots in the region is directly related to the social isolation and governance disconnect between the north and south. It was not until the early 1990's that Tablighi begun actively proselytizing in Mali. Not coincidentally around the same time that the Malian government reduced its actives in the region substantially. Where Islamic traditions are less acute, specifically amongst Taureg populations that remained less interspersed with their North African neighbors, Tablighi teaching has had the greatest impact.

Officially the Tablighi claim that they are firmly a-political however ICG and other political analysis point out that a common thread amongst many violent extremists is that many began as converts to Tablighi before moving on to more extreme expressions of the Islamic faith. "Part of the appeal of the [Tablighi] movement is undoubtedly its strong sense of communal identity and mutual support," (ICG 2005, 8). This is significant, as Taureg communities have historically lacked a communal identity with their regional neighbors. The following is a more descriptive understanding of what motivates participation in this movement:

> Participation thus gave meaning and purpose to everyday life. It is important to see that participation in such a movement, often explained as a response to the failure of the corrupt, underdeveloped, or alienating societies in which Muslims perhaps find themselves in, in fact offered a positive, modern solution to people who were geographically and socially mobile. Participants in principle made a "lifestyle" choice; they found a stance of cultural dignity; they opted for a highly disciplined life of sacrifice; they found a moral community of mutual acceptance and purpose, (Metcalf 2001).

Kidal is Mali's eastern-most region, and it has been the most receptive to the Tablighi for the exact reasons mentioned above, most importantly for this thesis is the element of

"underdeveloped" societies that are left vulnerable. In conversations with local residents ICG found that prior to the early 1990's Kidal had very little in terms built infrastructure on economic activity with the exception of prison and military outpost, arguably not the ideal symbols of development. After the early 1990's development that has occurred has been met with skepticism on behalf of locals stating specifically "that there had been no development that was 'consequential' or 'appropriate' to the needs of the north," (ICG 2005, 20). This would imply that the schools, latrines, and administrative buildings which ICG noticed had been constructed by state actors was not meeting deeper needs, most likely economic development needs.

The story is similar for Mali's other northern regions, Timbuktu and Gao. Timbuktu located further north is equally as remote and "virtually inaccessible" as Kidal. Although the needs vary, Timbuktu as an important UNESCO World Heritage Site and has economic incentives related to tourism. All three regions and cities are in need of development planning that is not based on the needs of the agricultural-based south, but that strengthens the unique differences of the northern mobile communities. Ideally, policies should strengthen the economic sectors that those communities have an historical experience with such as raising livestock and tourism instead of policies that due to their "inconsequential" or "inappropriate" nature promote smuggling and other illicit economic growth.

The international development actors must come to terms with the fact that until development planning actually meets the needs and concerns of the disenfranchised communities, those very communities they aim to assist will continue to seek other alternative opportunities that undermine state, regional and global security. ICG the summarizes this dynamic well, "Even organizations known to most Americans purely as terrorist groups, like Hezbollah or Hamas, use a large part of their funds to provide social services, which is a major reason why they continue to enjoy popular support from the populations they serve, (ICG 2005, 13)." Governance and development agendas must specifically reduce communities' dependency on such organizations by not allowing them to do their jobs for them. "[Smuggling networks] have

become the economic lifeblood of Saharan peoples whose livestock was devastated by the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s…" (ICG 2005, I). It will require substantial monetary and political efforts.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE & INTERVENTION

Governance

To quote Sir Winston Churchill, "It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others that have been tried." An important assumption of this thesis is the supremacy of democracy in decision-making and governance. In order for the conceptual themes discussed such as inclusive and sustainable development processes as well as the decentralization of governments' institutional capacities to occur there assumes a foundation of democratic principles exist. This is not to say that sustainable development and inclusive policies are unable to exist outside of democracy, it is simply not contained in the perspective of this thesis.

Poor governance is not only an obstacle for sustainable development but is the driver of many political issues and conflict. One major factor often cited in Africa, behind the systems of governance in place, is the remnant of colonial legacies that deliberately isolated and favored one ethnic group over others. This is certainly not the first time, nor will it be the last, that colonialism will be blamed for Africa's arrested development. However, since independence, little has been done on behalf of the nascent governments to recognize and correct the patterns of patrimony enforced under colonial rule, (UN-HABITAT 2005, 102). Instead in many ways they have used their power to reinforce such behavior. Regarding the conditions that led to the breakdown of society and sustain its underdevelopment continent-wide Bates writes:

> When thinking about the origins of political disorder in Africa, I can find no way of analyzing the origins of insurrection without starting with the behavior of governments. The conditions that led to the breakdown of order in Africa

include the authoritarian nature of its states and their rulers' penchant for predation, (Bates 2008).

Simply put, at the crux of the crisis is the issue of governance. There is no subtle way around the matter – if urban planning is to play a more proactive role in the development and the peace-building process it must wrestle with the issue of governance. More specifically it must bolster opportunities for better governance to take root. But what kind of governance, and is it enough to focus on *bad* governance in order to drive *good* development? The opinion here is that the answer is, no. Judith Tendler in her book *Good Governance in the Tropics* summarizes the significance of good governance and the need to rethink the approach development practitioners have taken to address governance as follows: "The explanations of poor performance…although in many ways was accurate, have given rise to a consistently flawed body of advice about how to improve government," (Tendler 1997, 2). Instead she argues a new approach is in order and one goal of this thesis will be to draw out examples that highlight opportunities for which to build trust and ownership and to bolster *good* governance.

In her research, focusing on governance in Brazil, Tendler (1997, 13-15) observed five factors that radically affected the role in which good governance across multiple communities in Brazil was able to have significant impact. These five observations are summarized as follows:

1) Worker dedication;
2) Sense of *calling* or *mission*;
3) Worker autonomy and vision for the public good;
4) Worker accountability through citizen engagement and monitoring; and
5) Decentralization that puts civic associations and NGOs in closer proximity to government decision making.

Her observations are largely related to the daily administrative functions of a typical government employee in Brazil. However, they highlight an important element of governance that is imperative for lasting changes to take root – e.g. *ownership*. This plays out particularly at the interface between government administrators and the public. At a time when UN-

HABITAT and other organizations are trying to encourage the decentralization of governments across Africa, these observations should not be overlooked. This assumes that decentralization is occurring in democratic societies. If decentralization is to occur in a manner that actually does benefit the populations towards which government is moving closer then safeguards and values must be in place that prevent grafting at multiple levels rather than just one. Decentralization is great but without systems in place to provide checks and balances across all levels nothing really changes. As historically centralized governments move closer to their people beyond the borders of the capital city, building transparency and accountability into their systems may not be enough; there must be ownership across various administrative levels and including the public.

For West Africa in particular, especially its central countries, the urban capitals and their relationship to the region are of particular importance. The region, as UN-HABITAT refers to it, is an 'integration space' where official state borders are drastically different from the natural and ethnic regions that existed prior. The cities across the region are an important and often primary force behind development for a particular country. As cities, primarily capital cities, continue to function in this role the need for governance reform that is further reaching becomes more and more imperative, especially as the 2020 estimated urbanization threshold quickly approaches.[5]

The region is also home to ancient trade routes that crisscross the Sahel and the Sahara. Borders, especially in the remote desert areas of northern Mali, eastern Mauritania, and western Niger, have historically been quite fluid. These patterns of trade and familiar migration have, therefore, developed an urban system of towns and outposts in an otherwise vacant and extremely harsh environment. Despite the distance and isolation of some of these towns they are still dependent on the larger capital cities for governmental services such as funding, infrastructure both roadways and irrigation for agriculture development, and health and educational programing. As UN-HABITAT points out:

[5] 2020 is the estimated year in which the majority of West Africans will live in urban centers.

> Traditional governance structures such as municipal government, provincial boards, federal district authorities, etc., have, without exception, proven inadequate because their legal and institutional structures have been designed for single-municipality, mono-centric cities, rather than multi-municipal, multi-nodal regional urban systems, (UN-HABITAT 2010, 30).

Where UN-HABITAT is primary focused on the *form* governance takes across varying municipal levels and the current lack of capacity to move beyond a singular urban focus Tendler would amend that it is also the *substance* of governance that must be taken into consideration. Combining these two perspectives, governance that is further reaching in its capacity will be better than what currently exist, however it is not good governance until it is also further reaching in terms of expressing a common mission, values, and local ownership.

This is especially applicable for Mali and other parts of West Africa given the extreme distances and vast state territories. Thus, a coordinated regional approach between Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and even Algeria may be beneficial for redefining the economic drivers and developing legitimate trade along the ancient routes that actively engages and empowers those communities to develop sustainably and even combat human rights violations such as human trafficking that occur.

Given the dynamic demographic and overwhelming geographic nature of West Africa, what does *good* governance for the region actually entail? UN-HABITAT address it as follows, "As interurban flows of commodities, people, communications, funds and physical urban patterns become more trans-national, governance and policy must follow suit if they are to be in any effective position to influence outcomes," (UN-HABITAT 2010, 22). This means that new policies are required that include a regional approach and for good governance to exist this will mean strengthening and legitimizing economic ties across borders.

Understanding why Africa has struggled to develop for so many decades has been the source of much debate. It is important to consider why or how states unravel if practitioners are to develop practical and relevant goals, and innovative programs for redevelopment. Across Africa there are key topics that have been widely discussed. At the forefront of these topics is often the relationship between ethnic diversity and political conflict. Many academics and specifically social scientists have argued that there is a causal relationship between the two that ultimately results in conflict and state failure. Bates makes a different argument, that for the purpose here, we will explore further. That is, "*Ethnic diversity* does not cause violence; rather, ethnicity and violence are joint products of state failure," (Bates 2008, 10). What does this mean for governance? It means that the role of poor governance which is the real source of state failure manifests its self in violence along ethnic or tribal separations; or as is the case in Mali and West Africa also along Islamic distinctions. This is evident in post-colonial states where significant violence, such as the Rwanda genocide, did not occur until after independence where the fledgling governments continued to operate under the patterns of their colonial predecessors.

Bates also addresses the issue of *resources*, particularly that political disorder is correlative to the financing of conflict through natural resource exploitation as opposed to the view that the value of natural resources leads to state failure indicative of the "resource curse." Regarding *democracy*, which is often cited by those new or unfamiliar to the democratic principles and processes as being divisive rather than uniting, he articulates the relationship of political reform and political disorder, not democracy and conflict. And finally, regarding the issue of *income* (or lack of income) he suggests that public revenues are more indicative of political order rather than private income (Bates 2008, 11-13).

Good governance, operating under Bates arguments, will have a very different approach. In addressing these topics *good* governance should aim for inclusion rather than exclusion not just among ethnic and tribal differences but between informal and formal societal structures. It should educate people and promote awareness of democratic principles and processes through

political reforms that are transparent and held accountable. And finally, good governance should distribute access to services and wealth through not only political and administrative decentralization but fiscal as well.

Given this approach to understanding the nature of Africa's struggle for stability how might these normative "good governance" statements made above actually are applied to the context of West Africa?

Governance intervention must specifically address the issue of poverty. Poverty, whether it is found in slums or informal settlements, poses additional risks to public health and environmental degradation. As urbanization, or more specifically over-urbanization, that is economically lagging behind, continues at aggressive rates in West African cities, so too will the proliferation and urbanization of poverty. The risks to local and regional stability, amongst others mentioned earlier, exposed by poverty weaken a society's capacity to respond to crisis. Additionally, UN-HABITAT points out that such a significant level of poverty is no longer limited to a nation's territory delimited by jurisdictional borders but the effects of which have regional and even global implications for security.

From a regional perspective UN-HABITAT is quick, and accurate, to point out the role that governance must play in addressing poverty and slum upgrading across multiple regional urban environments, citing specially the implications poverty has on security and stability. "Poverty can only weaken any society's capacity to tackle organized crime, human trafficking, armed conflict, terrorism, social unrest and the spread of disease," (UN-HABITAT 1997, 6). However, for countries in the midst of political instability that are already experiencing many of the challenges listed above, what are the implications for policy going forward? Is addressing poverty as a source of instability enough to restore stability?

In West Africa, the primary source of urbanization is driven predominantly by natural growth rather than migratory fluctuation (although the latter still exists and is extremely important).

Additionally the growth of inferior cities is exceeding the growth rates of larger cities, yet another contributing factor to the unique urbanization trends affecting West Africa, (UN-HABITAT 2014, 98-99). Nevertheless, urbanization trends continue to increase putting stress on governments with limited capacities to respond to- and accommodate the influx. Cities' growth across the region, and urban environments dispersed throughout individual state territories, are growing naturally yet the economic activity and opportunities (employment and access to services) are focused on one single large city or economic hub (usually the capital) from country to country. The challenges to that single city are compounded as natural growth is occurring at high rates and migration continues to bring others to the city in search for better opportunities. As governments and city managers fail to respond adequately to provide and care for all of their population's needs slums and poverty continue to grow.

The UN-HABITAT report *The State of African Cities 2014: Re-Imagining Sustainable Urban Transitions* indicates another notable trend taking place in West Africa; that is the reduction in the average distance between urban centers (defined as those with populations greater than 10,000). Over the latter half of the 20th century the average distance went from 111 km. to 33 km., (similar in scale as going from the distance between New York City and Washington D.C. or 226 miles, to the distance between New York City and Trenton, NJ or 67 miles) a substantial reduction (70%) assisted by improvements in infrastructure, (UN-HABITAT 2014, 99). These emerging regional networks provide important opportunities for economic cooperation, but if the political will remains singularly concentrated on primary capital cities by 2050 it may be too late. As stated earlier when discussing the issue of poverty specifically within a city's borders UN-HABITAT said, "When public policies are of benefit only for small political or economic elites, urbanization will almost inevitably result in instability, as cities become unlivable for rich and poor alike," (UN-HABITAT 2010, 1). This could also be true from the regional perspective. The increasing urbanization of one city poses enough challenges for development however when this statement is applied to the urbanization of multiple cities (as is the case in West Africa), when only one city benefits the challenge becomes significantly much more complex. Addressing poverty and slums in Bamako alone is not enough. If the Malian government were

able to adequately address these issues and eliminate them, Bamako will still continue to grow as people seek better opportunities that only exist in the capital than those that exist in the rural areas. The scale of the country's "political elite" or select few will merely shift to be the city of Bamako, leaving other urban centers such as Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu (all cities in the north) to fend for themselves.

In this way does addressing poverty only at the capital city level actually help ease instability by targeting the rate of urbanization (or over-urbanization) that governments and cities have the capacity to address? Governance reforms must include a statewide or even regional approach and should target regional economic activities thereby reducing the rate of over-urbanization in the primary city and by reducing the need for migration. Stronger links (physically, administratively, and economically) between primary and secondary cities is important so that economic growth is equally distributed – a rising tide raises all boats.

For cities and regions where the symptoms of instability are already major issues then poverty should be viewed as one measurement of stability rather than just as the cause. When we view poverty as the cause of instability we run the risk of over simplifying its role in instability. Actions moving forward tend to focus on restoring security through armed interventions, reducing the prevalence of illicit networks by restricting movement; altogether treating the symptoms but not adequately addressing the root cause. When we view poverty as a measurement of instability we start to address the root causes of instability of which poverty is an indicator. Restoring stability and reducing poverty in this light requires a deeper understanding of the drivers of poverty that may vary across regions. Creating the means in which excluded factions and marginalized populations within society are able to contribute to the economy and benefit from its prosperity. An important indicator of poverty is the income/wealth disparity between the political or economic elite and those living in urban slums also referred to as the GINI coefficient. A GINI coefficient closer to 0 indicates that there is an equal distribution of wealth across a society where as a coefficient closer to 100 indicates greater imbalance. However, the GINI coefficient is only helpful as one indictor, as some

country's may have relatively little imbalance this could simply mean that everyone is equally poor, therefore a low GINI coefficient would not indicate poverty especially in peri-urban and rural areas that do not have a diversity of income. Mali, as of 2010, has a GINI coefficient of 33.0 whereas the U.S.A. has a coefficient of 41.1. Understanding poverty and its proportional make-up within a society both urban and rural may be more descriptive as it highlights areas of need and root causes of poverty that then migrates to the city. A concerted effort must be made to not only treat poverty and alleviate slum conditions in the primary economic cities but also to address the conditions that exist in the peri-urban and rural regions; otherwise the poor will continue to seek opportunities where they exist in the cities, further draining resources and governance capacities in the capital cities.

Aid

It would be quite difficult, and perhaps even negligent, to analyze development in any part of Africa without considering the role that *aid* has played in bringing us to the present predicament. The economist Dambisa Moyo, points out that over the last few decades over $1 trillion has been given to Africa and argues further that it has had an overall detrimental impact on the continent.

Crisis and post-crisis urban contexts pose unique challenges to development and governance. Given the lack of security in conflict regions it is nearly impossible for significant development to occur in the fragile political environments. As emergency foreign aid attempts to bandage the wounds inflicted during these times of crisis and as national and international actors begin to restore a sense of security to the region, often these "solutions" do not adequately address the root causes of the crisis beyond the initial shock or they ignore them completely. Whatever security may follow is thus tentative, at best, until underlying social and economic issues are addressed.

Such an approach to governance, that is holistic in methodology and implementation, requires not only building trust on behalf of governments and their citizens but also between those

same governments as aid recipients and their donor countries; necessitating better policies surrounding all aspects of aid.

How aid is determined, donated, and distributed has been the source of endless debate. However, one fact remains quite obvious and unavoidable, for development to be truly sustainable, the amount of aid monies required over time must diminish and eventually become obsolete. The very definition of aid implies that a person or organization lack the means to achieve a goal independently; contradictory to sustainability which implies the ability of a system to operate on its own without exhausting its resources. Bilateral aid, no matter how benevolent, is never given freely, it is always attached to an agenda, earmarked for a specific purpose or project, funneled through specific organizations, or intended to strengthen a specific relationship or cooperation.

The role of aid is an important factor in development and certain forms of aid may be better than others, but ultimately *aid* that creates dependence on more *aid*, is in essence the definition of addiction, like over prescribing pain-killers. This is specifically concerning the use of *bilateral* and *multilateral* aid (*government-to-government* and *institutional-to-government* transfers respectively) not charity-aid or emergency-aid donations which have their time and place, or as Moyo states, "Charity and emergency aid are small beer when compared with the billions transferred each year directly to poor countries' governments," (Moyo 2009, 8). Governments that rely on large cash transfers from rich governments are decreasingly held accountable to their constituency and are therefore increasingly more interested in preserving their own lifestyles under aid rather than providing for their citizens. In May 2013, the Wall Street Journal reported that at a fundraising conference in Brussels the international community would donate nearly $4.3 billion to the redevelopment of Mali (primary donors were EU member states, the U.S.A., Japan, the World Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank). From the U.S.A. alone this included $180 million in bilateral aid and an additional $32 million in humanitarian assistance (WSJ 2013). Since Mali's independence in 1960 it has

received $13,477,890,000 in bilateral aid. The majority (54%) of that aid has come from France, EU, and the U.S.A., (World Bank, 2012).

From an historical account concerning the involvement of donors Tendler points out that, "The donor community has focused most of its attention on downsizing government to the exclusion of complementary measures required to increase performance," (Tendler 1997, 5). Particularly in response to poor governance, donors have pursued policies that further constrain governments' capacities, in some ways perpetuating a deteriorating circumstance. She draws attention to the fact that many interpretations of the literature focus on themes of preventing bad governance and damage mitigation.

> "Nevertheless, this set of ideas about the causes of poor performance and about how to improve it profoundly influences the way development practitioners interpret what they see, write reports, and give advice. The explanations of poor performance summarized above, although in many ways was accurate, have given rise to a consistently flawed body of advice about how to improve government," (Tendler 1997, 2).

Ultimately these perspectives also influence the way in which aid is used to develop or improve capacities. Tendler challenges the approach of labeling whole governments as either *good* or *bad* performers and encourages practitioners to think differently and draws on case examples of good performance by various actors, agencies, and/or institutions to inform recommendations. Interventions carried out in a coordinated "bottom-up" approach with clearly defined state level responsibilities and incentives for good behavior may lead to more productive uses of bilateral aid.

Additionally (or even circularly) donors complicate matters on the ground by attaching the money provided with various reporting requirements, thereby demanding even more of governments with limited capacities and contributing to considerable delays and the actual

spending of aid donation. In his article, "Institutional Destruction Resulting from Donor and Project Proliferation in Sub-Saharan African Countries" Elliott R. Morss states, "Each donor has its own development goals and each has its own project preparation requirements. Each sends its own project preparations teams out, and each expects to meet with senior government officials," (Morss 1984, 466). Reporting requirements are just one in a number of stipulations placed on aid and in order to accommodate donor governments considerable resources are demanded of recipient governments. Morss goes on to point out that both donor agencies and recipients are aware of this spiraling dynamic, to the extent that promises are often made that cannot be delivered.

> "Donor staff know these things will happen, but they cannot act as if they expect them to occur: 1) they are paid to plan an disburse monies through development projects; 2) they could not get their projects through their own agency's approval process if they made realistic estimates of the recipient countries' abilities to make resource commitments to projects," (Morss 1984, 467).

While Morss' article may at first glance seem a bit outdated (by 29 years) policy changes require a considerable amount of time. It would appear that the most noticeable change over the past three decades would be the introduction of the Patriot Act, and the emergence of more donor agencies and organizations; including Muslim faith-based organizations that because of the stipulations under the Patriot Act create additional challenges for coordination.

Ultimately 'capacity-building' is undermined by the very 'capacity-requirements' made of limited governments. Coupled with the fact that historically recipients have been negatively reinforced by poor governance generalizations and subsequent policies, the effect, regardless of where the money is coming from is the opposite of sustainability, "In short, they will end up catering to the views and demands of foreign donors rather than learning on their own through trial and error what policies they should be promoting," (Morss 1984, 467).

When a person does not have the ability to make decisions for him- or herself any ownership in the process that he or she would otherwise have is undermined. The consequence of which is that whatever opportunity for growth and learning (by doing) is thereby sacrificed. In this regard, the adage often referenced by the development community that says, 'give a man a fish and he'll eat for a day, teach a man to fish and he will eat for life,' should be seriously reconsidered. Aid that undermines learning-by-doing has a counter effect of essentially hiding the man's fishing pole and slapping him with the fish he must eat by your rules.

Moyo explores the role of aid further as an important factor in the undermining of African development highlighting the pop-culture attitude as it relates to the pressure put on both donors and recipients. She states:

> "Aid has become part of the entertainment industry. Media figures, film stars, rock legends eagerly embrace aid, proselytize the need for it, upbraid us for not giving enough, scold governments for not doing enough – and governments respond in kind, fearful of losing popularity and desperate to win favour," (Moyo 2009, XVIII).

At the macro level, through this cycle of aid, governments in the developing world become focused on seeking aid as they are no longer accountable to their own citizens to provide better services and good governance. The status quo remains unchanged as does the need for additional aid monies. On the micro level this creates an equal dependence of impoverished citizens on local and international non-governmental organizations that have substituted rather than supplemented what should be the role of elected officials and government agencies.

Moyo's primary premise is to explore "aid-free solution to development." Meaning the ultimate role of aid, should be to reduce and eliminate a government's dependency on aid through institutional and capacity building. This would imply investment in new approaches for governance and capacity building. Taken a step further capacity building in urban planning on

multiple levels could also open up additional channels for which to streamline aid distribution and where necessary by-pass weak institutions.

Urban Planning

"Since cities are the future habitat for the majority of Africans, *now* is the time for spending on basic infrastructure, social services (health and education) and affordable housing, in the process stimulating urban economies and generating much-needed jobs," (UN-HABITAT 1997, 1). As indicated earlier, if urbanization trends continue, the majority of West Africans will be living in cities a full thirty years sooner than the rest of the continent. In this regard, it is important to remember that it is the secondary cities that are expected to account for the majority of urban growth not the primary capital cities.

As a point of clarification, urban planning distinctions, including the difference between a city and town, vary from country to country. UN-HABITAT references *secondary cities* across Africa, as those with populations under 500,000 people. This would lead us to understand that cities without such a distinction that are larger than 500,000 could be considered *primary cities*. This can get confusing as large metropolitan clusters like Lagos in Nigeria, Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Cairo in Egypt which are each in the tens of millions are referred to as *conurbations*. However, these distinctions only consider one variable, population. It is an important variable but it is also lacking in depth. For the purposes of this thesis, when I refer to *primary* and *secondary* cities I am not specifically talking about population. In Mali, there is only one city that is over 1 million in population, Bamako. Not only is it home to a significant percent of the population, it is also the economic driver for growth in Mali, and it is the center for political decision-making. These three factors (population, economic significance, and political capacity) combine to make it a primary city. Secondary cities, which in Mali are far below the 500K population threshold, would in other parts of the world be considered towns. Nonetheless they are important for circumstances in West Africa as they are included in UN-HABITAT figures as urban areas expected to receive three-fourths of the total growth, (UN-HABITAT 2005, 102).

This is not to say primary cities are shrinking or plateauing, they are growing as well. However, urban planning policies and initiatives that focus on one city or simply "the city" inconsiderate of the regional networks will fail to developed policies that encourage inclusive growth. Thus creating further economic dependency on the capital and perpetuating historic grievances caused by policies that treat vast regions as homogenous.

One major challenge to understanding the role of urban planning in such an extreme environment is the fact that this analysis is dominated by the 10,000 foot perspective (UN-HABITAT, UNDP, USAID, and the UN) when in reality the practice of urban planning is a much more intimate experience, operating at a geographically specific level while addressing local issues. In this regard, top-down approaches are flawed yet they remain to be the modus-operandi throughout the developing world. Arguably this is so international actors as indicated above can remain flexible across distinctly different regions and issues. As over-urbanization continues to cause challenges to governance in many African and West African cities, the flaws of such outdated planning is quite clear – exclusion and increasing informality (UN-HABITAT 2009, VII) where flexibility without adaptability is useless as policies and programs are not sufficiently localized. Traditional approaches to urban planning are increasingly insufficient given the challenges in West African pertaining to governance and the increasing levels of poverty. In conflict and post-conflict environments, such as in Mali, traditional urban planning methods do not address root causes of instability that have statewide and regional implications. Expanding the traditional practice of urban planning to focus on regional linkages and inclusive development requires that urban planning engages with the larger community of statewide and regional stakeholders.

In its 2009 report *Planning Sustainable Cities* UN-HABITAT identifies as a key contributing factor to many urban issues plaguing development is the insignificant changes made in urban planning approaches and systems over the last 100 years, stating specifically:

> "[Antiquated planning systems] are often contributors to urban problems rather than functioning as tools for human and environmental improvement…In most parts of the world, current approaches to planning must change and that a new role for urban planning in sustainable urban development has to be found," (UN-HABITAT 2009, VI).

Changes must be made in urban planning approaches if sustainability is to be the driving force behind development going forward. "If and when regional integration and cooperation becomes a reality and long-distance roads materialize, existing urban areas could become important new population nodes between sub-Saharan and Northern Africa," (UN-HABITAT 2010, 103). Models of regional urban planning approaches exist. In the U.S.A. the Regional Planning Association of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut address issues from the greater metropolitan perspective. However a major difference is the fact that even though the region may span multiple state and legislative borders there remains one cohesive nucleus – the New York City metropolitan region. For West Africa a "regional perspective" will not only span statewide jurisdictions but will require transnational cooperation especially in regions that are sparsely populated and quite removed from capital cities. If Mali, as one government, is unable to sufficiently govern its isolated northern territories then perhaps the region consisting of Mauritania, Algeria, and Niger would benefit from coordinated development efforts that target the trade corridor running through each country's remote territories.

A New Role

The "new role of urban planning for sustainability" which UN-HABITAT discusses in the 2009 report on Planning Sustainable Cities highlights the flowing factors impacting the future of urban development as follows, (UN-HABITAT 2009, VII):

- Environmental challenges of climate change
- Demographic challenges (including rapid urbanization and youth development)
- Economic challenges (including increasing informality)
- Socio-Spatial challenges (including spatial inequality)
- Decision-Making/Democratization challenges

In order for urban planning to adequately rise to the challenges listed above UN-HABITAT also stresses the need for a national plan. However a national plan within a post-conflict society may need to also account for additional factors. In a post-conflict environment such as Mali, where negotiations are still underway or in the environment immediately following a peace agreement, just because the fighting as stopped does not mean that lasting peace has been achieved. A national planning strategy that does not adequately address past grievances will incorrectly prioritize development or redevelopment objectives.

On the global level, an important discussion underway at the United Nations headquarters in New York City is the post 2015 development agenda. The 2015 date set for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has unceremoniously expired. However, even though the 2015 deadline has come, the development goals remain a priority. The goals going forward have been determined to be the same as those under the MDGs. What is at the heart of the debate within the General Assembly are the indicators and measurements by which the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, as opposed to MDGs) will be monitored and recorded.

This will have profound implications on regions, states, and even cities' abilities to address the factors listed above. Before, under the MDGs, the goals were for the most part global in scope and focus. Nations had a very difficult time reconciling the goals with their unique situations and circumstance. Many African nations were not able to achieve most of the MDGs. Under the SDGs there is the potential to disaggregate data so that the information may be more useful to various levels of governments and more or less applicable depending on the needs and concerns of respective societies. The potential for urban environments is such that municipal level actors and governments may be more empowered with the resources and tools needed to make important policy changes as "sustainability" in the urban context is often quite different from the rural context, and the implications for the peri-urban environments can be a bit blurry.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Urban planning policies and initiatives that focus on one city or simply "the city" inconsiderate of the regional networks will fail to developed policies that encourage inclusive growth. Thus creating further economic dependency on the capital and perpetuating historic grievances caused by policies that treat vast regions as homogenous. Recalling the three objectives of good urban planning in the beginning there are two primary perspectives in which the following recommendations are positioned. The first is spatial, in which recommendations are originally made based on expanding concentric circles. The smallest circle is the capital or primary economic center, the next smallest being the state-wide network of other key cities, and the largest circle being the regional or multi-state context. However, this spatial perspective does not appreciate the urgency of the needs of the greater region instead prioritizes the city. An alternative approach places the *city* beneath the *state* and the *region* emphasizing the nature of cities in West Africa to carry their respective countries and regions economically. At the same time this perspective places greater focus on the region and the importance of urban center in creating regional stability as well as highlighting peri-urban transitions and state boundaries.



The second set of recommendations was similarly originally placed within concentric circles encapsulating the temporal nature of conflict. The first circle under this approach addresses the role of urban planning during the conflict, the second addresses what should be done while the ink is drying immediately following peace agreements, and then moved into the development process. A flaw in this perspective defines conflicts as independent of each other

and does not consider the role of poor development in perpetuating conflicts. Under a cyclical perspective, within the development phase we will consider (perhaps a bit pessimistically) what can be done in anticipation or prevention of conflict relapse.



Spatial Recommendations

A regional focus on mobility is a tangible implementation of urban planning practice and will be important for long-term sustainable development and economic growth. The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) which has been developed by the U.S.A. is an important place to start. The PSI is already regionally focused Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad.



The initiative's primary purpose is to specifically improve each country's own ability to secure its territory through military training. Security is absolutely necessary for other forms of development to occur. However, without enhancing the capacity of other institutions or civil-society in the sparsely populated north, the economic capacities that currently exist (despite their legality) will be cut off. Without a plan to substitute those capacities with legitimate economic activity, growth in the region will not occur and the current livelihoods of the people will be diminished, further aggravating the disenfranchised sentiment that already exists and forcing more people to look for work elsewhere, namely in Bamako and other regional capitals. In no way am I arguing that the development community should promote illicit activity, but a purely military approach could be detrimental in the long-term if not accompanied but economic growth by essentially training the next generation of rebel aggressors. Tourism in Timbuktu and Kidal, agriculture in Gao, and livestock are the obvious sectors that should be promoted for which the population has an established history. Regional mobility in terms of tourism could promote economic activity across multiple countries, Mali and Niger which are already and targeted under the PSI and Algeria which plays an established role in the illicit trade

routes that currently exist. Developing transportation infrastructure (i.e. roads and airports) between these regions along the already existing trade routes would allow for better regional management (military mobility) and the delivery of emergency aid supplies in the short-term and economic trade and tourism in the long-term.



A focus on mobility within Mali's territory would help facilitate the decentralization process already underway by strengthening transportation links between secondary cities and smaller towns and villages. The responsibility for these projects would fall to the Ministry of Housing, Planning, and Land Affairs and would require coordination with the Ministry of Decentralization and Planning. A wider view of mobility should be adapted to also include water infrastructure for providing sanitation and livelihood support to arid desert regions and should include enhancing river traffic along the Niger River which also flows through Ségou, Timbuktu, and Gao. By strengthening regional links to Bamako and more importantly between each other economic activity will be enhanced that would subsequently occur along these routes Mali may be able to reduce the dependency its citizens have on Bamako as the primary economic force

and source of governance. This would also strengthen regional capacities as appropriate subsequent development will occur and accommodate the diversity between northern and southern Malians.

Temporal Recommendations

In the midst of conflict, at the epicenter and the height of fighting, there is for obvious security reasons very little traditional "urban planning" can do except wait for the appropriate time to respond. However, even at such a point in time during the fighting aid resources are still flowing particularly in regards to alleviating the burdens that surrounding cities, statewide regions, and neighboring countries must carry as they assist and provide for the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In the midst of the violence aid is predominately focused on putting a stop to and relieving the immediate suffering. Urban planning in this context should make strides to help design better refugee camps that are environmentally less degrading, and whenever appropriate reinforce the temporary nature of refugee camps.

In the immediate post-conflict environment, as the dust is still settling, prioritizing projects and needs may prove to be a difficult task especially for the international aid community lacking a complete understanding. In this context urban planners would be an important source of community knowledge: priorities, needs, networks, overlooked ethnic minorities, and underlying conflict motivators. Urban planning or planners can identify infrastructure projects such as the construction of key roads, bridges, and airports that will help ease the delivery of critical aid supplies, while at the same time improving on the pre-conflict and/or existing infrastructure with long-term goals of sustainable development in mind. The placement of schools, clinics, and hospitals that are accessible to rural communities and which continue to serve more communities after the immediate need has been resolved.

As post-conflict tension begins to subside and substantial development is able to begin to occur, a realist approach to urban planning would assume that any kind of peace that exists is

merely temporary and more conflict looms on the horizon. Developing the capacity of urban planners, where such professionals do not currently exist, may be able to in the least curb future violence. Recalling the "many roles" that urban planners often play when interacting with multiple stakeholders across various levels of government developing 'urban planning' skills amongst local populations, pertaining to conflict negotiation, multi-stakeholder management and analysis, and community engagement and participation could provide opportunities for communities to resolve potential conflicts before they reach uncontainable levels. Additionally, the training and development of urban planning professionals will future enhance decentralization efforts and local administrative capacities to facilitate spending, and to create more livable urban and regional environments that are directly in tune with communities' needs and preferences.

RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

The vision of a regional focus on West Africa became more and more challenging each day as current circumstances in the region pertaining to public health and the availability of data were and continue to be constantly evolving. A site visit to Mali was unrealistic at this juncture given the outbreak of Ebola and travel safety restrictions in place by university policies and time constraints. As a result of these limitations I was unable to observe key variables which were discussed in the body of the paper in action on the ground as they interact with local Malians and with each other. The research was, therefore, highly dependent on available literature and is subsequently decidedly theoretical. Despite these methodological limitations a study such as this can still be useful to help frame subsequent research that will come next. In addition to contributing constructively to the ongoing debate as to the role of planning as leader versus follower it is the aim of this thesis to present key examples of *good* intervention that should be developed on further.

FUTURE RESEARCH

The obvious next step is on-site observation. I hope that this thesis will be able to illuminate additional areas within the spheres of development practice and good governance that urban

planning may be used as the delivery mechanism of development aid rather than the afterthought of the development process in areas of the developing world. And, to develop recommendations for the field of urban planning, specifically those planners interested in the post-crisis context, to engage in development and peace-building effectively and with cultural sensitivity.

CONCLUSION

Conflict and post-conflict environments pose particular development challenges. The agreements reached between various parties have yet to be implemented, and unless development proposal are differentiated based on the diversity of needs little should be expected in Mali in terms of lasting peace. The 'new role' urban planners will play in the future of development will be critical for achieving sustainable solutions. Urban planning policies and initiatives that focus on one city or simply "the city" inconsiderate of the regional networks will fail to developed policies that encourage inclusive growth. Thus, creating further economic dependency on the capital and perpetuating historic grievances caused by policies that treat vast regions as homogenous. Mobility of resources for the distribution of aid, wealth, and economic growth will play a key role and should be developed sooner rather than later, before rapid urbanization trends become reality in 2050 for Africa as a whole and 2020 for West Africa in particular.

TABLE & MAPS

(Table 1)

Country/Region	% Pop. Growth 2003*	% Pop. Growth 2004*	% Pop. Growth 2005*	% Pop. Growth 2006*	% Pop. Growth 2007*	% Pop. Growth 2008*	% Pop. Growth 2009	% Pop. Growth 2010	% Pop. Growth 2011	% Pop. Growth 2012	% Pop. Growth 2013	% Pop. Growth 10 Year Average	Total Land Area (sq.km.)	Total Population (2013)	Population Density (2013) ppl/sq.km.
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.63	2.64	2.66	2.67	2.68	2.69	2.7	2.7	2.71	2.71	2.7	2.70	24,291,100	936,876,500	39.67
West African Countries (16)†	2.69	2.68	2.68	2.67	2.66	2.65	2.63	2.61	2.59	2.57	2.56	2.64	6,146,140	331,251,397	53.90
All African Countries	2.28	2.30	2.33	2.38	2.37	2.40	2.37	2.41	2.31	2.37	2.36	2.36	30,067,306	1,109,110,426	36.89
United States of America	0.86	0.93	0.92	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.88	0.83	0.73	0.73	0.72	0.72	9,147,400	316,128,800	34.56
China	0.62	0.59	0.59	0.56	0.52	0.51	0.50	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.49	9,388,200	1,357,400,000	144.58
India	1.57	1.53	1.48	1.42	1.37	1.33	1.31	1.29	1.28	1.26	1.24	1.24	2,973,200	1,252,100,000	421.14
World	1.23	1.22	1.21	1.2	1.18	1.19	1.18	1.17	1.18	1.13	1.16	1.16	134,324,700	7,124,500,000	54.92
Algeria	1.31	1.38	1.48	1.6	1.69	1.77	1.82	1.85	1.87	1.89	1.87	1.87	2,381,700	39,208,200	16.46
Angola	3.53	3.54	3.49	3.43	3.39	3.34	3.29	3.24	3.18	3.12	3.08	3.08	1,246,700	21,471,600	17.22
Benin	3.33	3.3	3.22	3.14	3.08	3.01	2.94	2.87	2.8	2.73	2.68	2.68	114,760	10,323,500	91.55
Botswana	1.3	1.2	1.13	1.07	1.01	0.96	0.93	0.9	0.88	0.86	0.86	0.86	581,730	2,021,100	3.57
Burkina Faso	2.91	2.92	2.93	2.94	2.94	2.94	2.93	2.91	2.89	2.86	2.84	2.84	274,220	16,934,800	61.9
Burundi	3.17	3.34	3.4	3.44	3.49	3.49	3.45	3.37	3.28	3.19	3.13	3.13	27,830	10,162,500	395.74
Cameroon	2.6	2.59	2.58	2.58	2.58	2.57	2.56	2.56	2.55	2.54	2.52	2.52	475,440	22,254,000	47.08
Cape Verde	1.68	1.41	1.07	0.68	0.37	0.19	0.22	0.39	0.6	0.78	0.91	0.91	4,030	498,897	123.8
Central African Republic	1.64	1.66	1.71	1.78	1.84	1.89	1.92	1.94	1.96	1.99	2	2.00	622,980	4,616,400	7.41
Chad	3.85	3.73	3.55	3.36	3.21	3.1	3.04	3.03	3.02	3	2.98	2.98	1,284,000	12,825,300	10.19
Comoros	2.57	2.58	2.59	2.59	2.6	2.58	2.56	2.52	2.48	2.44	2.4	2.40	1,861	734,917	394.9
Congo	2.4	2.51	2.69	2.89	3.03	3.08	3.02	2.88	2.73	2.61	2.52	2.52	342,000	4,447,600	13.02
Cote D'Ivoire	1.4	1.38	1.45	1.53	1.61	1.72	1.85	2	2.15	2.29	2.37	2.37	322,460	20,316,100	63.89
Dem. Rep. Congo	2.9	2.93	2.89	2.85	2.83	2.81	2.8	2.78	2.76	2.74	2.72	2.72	2,344,900	67,513,700	29.78
Djibouti	1.42	1.41	1.4	1.4	1.41	1.42	1.44	1.47	1.5	1.52	1.53	1.53	23,200	872,932	37.66
Egypt	1.64	1.66	1.67	1.68	1.68	1.69	1.69	1.68	1.67	1.66	1.64	1.64	1,001,500	82,056,400	82.43
Equatorial Guinea	3.06	3.02	2.97	2.92	2.87	2.84	2.82	2.81	2.81	2.8	2.77	2.77	28,050	757,014	26.99
Eritrea	4.36	4.22	3.96	3.66	3.41	3.25	3.21	3.24	3.28	3.28	3.25	3.25	117,600	6,333,100	62.7
Ethiopia	2.88	2.84	2.8	2.75	2.71	2.67	2.65	2.63	2.6	2.58	2.55	2.55	1,104,300	94,100,800	94.1
Gabon	2.35	2.35	2.37	2.4	2.41	2.42	2.42	2.41	2.4	2.39	2.37	2.37	267,670	1,671,700	6.49
Gambia, The	3.15	3.17	3.15	3.14	3.13	3.13	3.14	3.16	3.18	3.19	3.19	3.19	11,300	1,849,300	182.74
Ghana	2.57	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.56	2.48	2.38	2.27	2.17	2.1	2.10	238,540	25,904,600	113.85
Guinea	1.74	1.88	2.08	2.3	2.5	2.63	2.66	2.63	2.59	2.56	2.53	2.53	245,860	11,745,200	47.8
Guinea-Bissau	2.21	2.2	2.19	2.17	2.16	2.17	2.22	2.28	2.34	2.39	2.42	2.42	36,130	1,704,300	60.61
Kenya	2.7	2.7	2.69	2.68	2.67	2.67	2.68	2.69	2.7	2.7	2.69	2.69	580,370	44,353,700	77.93
Lesotho	0.7	0.7	0.72	0.75	0.79	0.84	0.89	0.95	1.02	1.08	1.11	1.11	30,360	2,074,500	68.33
Liberia	1.73	1.92	2.64	3.46	3.98	4.18	3.97	3.51	3.03	2.68	2.44	2.44	111,370	4,294,100	44.58
Libya	1.53	1.54	1.58	1.63	1.67	1.62	1.48	1.27	1.03	0.84	0.76	0.76	1,759,500	6,201,500	3.52
Madagascar	3	2.96	2.92	2.89	2.85	2.83	2.82	2.81	2.8	2.8	2.79	2.79	587,295	22,924,900	39.4
Malawi	2.58	2.66	2.79	2.96	3.01	3.05	3.03	2.98	2.91	2.86	2.83	2.83	118,480	16,362,600	173.55
Mali	3.05	3.1	3.13	3.17	3.19	3.19	3.15	3.1	3.03	2.99	2.97	2.97	1,240,200	15,301,700	12.54
Mauritania	3.02	2.98	2.93	2.87	2.81	2.75	2.69	2.62	2.55	2.49	2.44	2.44	1,030,700	3,889,900	3.77
Mauritius	1.04	0.86	0.8	0.76	0.61	0.65	0.51	0.46	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.40	2,040	1,296,300	638.57
Morocco	0.94	0.9	0.9	0.89	0.89	0.93	1.03	1.16	1.31	1.43	1.49	1.49	446,550	33,008,200	73.96
Mozambique	2.82	2.81	2.76	2.71	2.67	2.63	2.6	2.56	2.53	2.5	2.47	2.47	799,380	25,833,800	32.85
Namibia	1.16	1.11	1.18	1.27	1.64	1.44	1.54	1.64	1.76	1.87	1.93	1.93	824,290	2,303,300	2.8
Niger	3.63	3.64	3.67	3.69	3.71	3.74	3.76	3.79	3.81	3.84	3.85	3.85	1,267,000	17,831,300	14.08
Nigeria	2.54	2.57	2.6	2.64	2.67	2.7	2.72	2.75	2.77	2.79	2.79	2.79	923,770	173,615,300	190.62
Rwanda	1.53	1.4	1.87	2.43	2.73	2.93	2.96	2.87	2.8	2.77	2.74	2.74	26,340	11,776,500	477.36
Sao Tome and Principe	2.06	2.27	2.47	2.67	2.85	2.93	2.92	2.84	2.74	2.65	2.57	2.57	960	192,993	201.03
Senegal	2.69	2.72	2.73	2.73	2.74	2.77	2.8	2.85	2.89	2.92	2.92	2.92	196,710	14,133,300	73.41
Seychelles	-1.08	-0.36	0.48	2.03	0.51	2.24	0.39	2.79	-2.63	0.98	0.98	0.98	460	89,173	193.85
Sierra Leone	4.77	4.47	3.82	3.1	2.53	2.21	1.95	1.94	1.95	1.91	1.88	1.88	72,300	6,092,100	84.4
Somalia	2.67	2.61	2.6	2.57	2.54	2.54	2.6	2.69	2.78	2.86	2.9	2.90	637,660	10,495,600	16.73
South Africa	1.3	1.31	1.31	1.31	1.32	1.32	1.33	1.33	1.33	1.34	1.34	1.34	1,219,100	52,982,000	43.68
South Sudan	3.6	3.69	3.92	4.11	4.21	4.28	4.32	4.32	4.33	4.3	4.14	4.14	644,330	11,296,200	n/a
Sudan	2.66	2.65	2.59	2.54	2.5	2.44	2.36	2.27	2.16	2.08	2.05	2.05	1,879,400	37,964,300	20.73
Swaziland	0.53	0.63	0.9	1.22	1.48	1.66	1.7	1.65	1.58	1.54	1.49	1.49	17,360	1,249,500	72.65
Tanzania	2.63	2.7	2.77	2.84	2.91	2.96	2.99	3.01	3.03	3.04	3.03	3.03	947,300	49,253,100	55.6
Togo	2.61	2.61	2.6	2.59	2.59	2.58	2.59	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.59	2.59	56,790	6,817,000	125.34
Tunisia	0.59	0.94	0.97	0.98	0.96	1.01	1.07	1.04	1.18	0.97	1.01	1.01	163,610	10,886,500	70.07
Uganda	3.39	3.4	3.39	3.38	3.37	3.36	3.36	3.36	3.36	3.35	3.34	3.34	241,550	37,578,900	188.07
Zambia	2.5	2.54	2.61	2.68	2.75	2.82	2.92	3.01	3.1	3.19	3.24	3.24	752,610	14,538,600	19.56
Zimbabwe	0.25	0.16	0.14	0.11	0.12	0.34	0.82	1.45	2.13	2.7	3.05	3.05	390,760	14,149,600	36.58
West African Ranking: Mali	5th	5th	5th	3rd	3rd	3rd	3rd	4th	3rd	3rd	3rd	3rd	2nd	6th	15th
Continent-Wide Ranking: Mali	12th	11th	11th	9th	9th	8th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th	9th	8th	21st	47th
# of W.A. countries in the top 10	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	3	2	2	4	2	1	2

* Due to the fact that disaggregated data for South Sudan are available for years 2003 through 2008 it is treated in this chart as a separate country despite the fact that it did not gain independence from Sudan until 2009.

† Countries that comprise the region of West Africa are highlighted in orange

World Bank Data, 2003-2013

(MAP 1) J. Richardson, 2015

CONTINENTAL AFRICA

Featuring Regional West Africa

The 16 Countries of West Africa Include:

- Benin
- Burkina Faso
- Cape Verde
- Côte d'Ivoire
- The Gambia
- Ghana
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Liberia
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Sénégal
- Sierra Leone
- Togo

Africa

West African Countries

0 250 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Miles

0 250 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Kilometers

Country-specific shapefiles provided by DIVA-GIS.org, GADM version 1.0, 2009

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(MAP 2) J. Richardson, 2015

REGIONAL WEST AFRICA

Featuring the 16 Countries of West Africa & Mali



Country-specific shapefiles provided by DIVA-GIS.org, GADM version 1.0, 2009

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(MAP 3) J. Richardson, 2015

COUNTRY OF MALI

Featuring the Capital District Bamako
& the 8 Administrative Districts



WESTERN SAHARA

ALGERIA

MAURITANIA

TIMBUKTU

KIDAL

GAO

MOPTI

KOULIKORO

KAYES

SÉGOU

SIKASSO

Bamako

NIGER

BURKINA FASO

Capital District Bamako
Administrative Boundaries
Mali
West Africa
North Africa

0 62.5 125 250 375 500
Miles
Kilometers
0 62.5 125 250 375 500

Country-specific shapefiles provided by DIVA-GIS.org, GADM version 1.0, 2009
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(MAP 4) J. Richardson, 2015

COUNTRY OF MALI

Featuring the Capital District Bamako,
Administrative Regions of Gao, Kidal, & Timbuktu,
& Water Resources



N
W E
S

Capital District Bamako
Administrative Boundaries: Gao, Kidal, & Timbuktu
Water
Mali

0 62.5 125 250 375 500 Miles
0 62.5 125 250 375 500 Kilometers

Country-specific shapefiles provided by DIVA-GIS.org, GADM version 1.0, 2009

(MAP 5) J. Richardson, 2015

COUNTRY OF MALI

Featuring the Capital District Bamako,
Administrative Districts of Gao, Kidal & Timbuktu
& Roadways



Country-specific shapefiles provided by DIVA-GIS.org, GADM version 1.0, 2009

(MAP 6) J. Richardson, 2015

REGIONAL MOBILITY

Featuring Algeria, Niger, & Mali

Algiers

ALGERIA

Tamanrasset

MALI

Kidal

Timbuktu

Gao

NIGER

Agadez

Niamey

Bamako

Capital Districts

Roadways

Mali

0 125 250 500 750 1,000 Miles

0 125 250 500 750 1,000 Kilometers

Country-specific shapefiles provided by DIVA-GIS.org, GADM version 1.0, 2009

Esri, HERE, DeLorme, MapmyIndia, © OpenStreetMap contributors, and the GIS user community

(MAP 7) J. Richardson, 2015

ILLICIT TRADE ROUTES

Featuring Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, & Mali



Country-specific shapefiles provided by DIVA-GIS.org, GADM version 1.0. 2009

(MAP 8) J. Richardson, 2015

PAN-SAHEL INITIATIVE COUNTRIES

Featuring Mauritania, Niger, Chad,
& Mali



Mali

Additional PSI Countries

0 135 270 540 810 1,080
Miles

0 130 260 520 780 1,040
Kilometers

Country-specific shapefiles provided by DIVA-GIS.org, GADM version 1.0, 2009

(MAP 9) J. Richardson, 2015

REGIONAL MOBILITY & TOURISM

Featuring Algeria, Niger,
& Mali

Algiers

ALGERIA

Tamanrasset

MALI

Kidal

NIGER

Timbuktu

Agadez

Gao

Niamey

Bamako

Focus Area
Capital Districts
Roadways
Mali

0 125 250 500 750 1,000
Miles

0 125 250 500 750 1,000
Kilometers

Country-specific shapefiles provided by DIVA-GIS.org, GADM version 1.0, 2009

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(MAP 10) J. Richardson, 2015

COUNTRY OF MALI

Featuring the Capital District Bamako,
Administrative Districts of Gao, Kidal & Timbuktu
& Roadways



Country-specific shapefiles provided by DIVA-GIS.org, GADM version 1.0, 2009

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